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REOPENER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
122 OF CERCLA: "FROM HERE TO
ETERNITY"
by:
Frederick W. Addison, III*
INALITY: the end of litigation, the certainty of settlement. It is the
goal of every client who finds himself in the unhappy arena of litiga-
tion. Long recognized as a necessary component of the judicial sys-
tem, Webster defines "finality" as "the character or condition of being final,
... conclusive, irrevocable or complete: conclusion."'
A dismissal with prejudice, a specific yet comprehensive release, the per-
formance of tasks, the exchange of consideration, liability and responsibility
are established and finalized. No admissions are made. Certainty replaces
uncertainty. Business continues. Life continues.
No such finality or certainty exists when resolving2 liability with the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). 3 Rather, settlement for cleanup at a Superfund 4 site is subject
to both the narrow terms of the EPA's release, called a covenant not to sue,
and by the application of several exceptions to covenants not to sue which
further diminish the salutary benefits normally associated with settlement. 5
* B.B.A., Southern Methodist University, 1974; J.D., University of Texas School of
Law, 1977. Mr. Addison is currently a shareholder of the Dallas law firm of Locke Purnell
Rain Harrell. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not represent
the position of any other person or entity. The author expresses his appreciation to librarians
of Locke Purnell Rain Harrell, Ms. Carolyn E. Grimes, Ms. Laura K. Justiss and Ms. K.
Marine Shaw for their retrieval of information used in this article.
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 851 (3d ed. 1986).
2. As to the United States or a state, liability under CERCLA is "resolved" rather than
settled. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1988).
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (amending CERCLA of 1980). See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0 (1988). See
Memorandum: Covenants Not to Sue Under SARA, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,038, 28,039-44 (1987)
(also published as OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (OSWER), EPA,
DIRECTIVE 9834.8 (July 10, 1987) [hereinafter Guidance].
4. Superfund is a commonly used synonym for CERCLA, after the tax-based fund estab-
lished thereunder.
5. The more general topic of settlement of CERCLA litigation after the 1986 SARA
amendments has been the subject of much commentary, including: William H. Hyatt, Jr.,
Negotiating Covenants Not to Sue under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act,
in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 1988: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL SOLU-
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These exceptions, or "reopeners," can be triggered by, inter alia, the discov-
ery of unknown conditions, or a determination by the EPA that the remedy
at the site has failed. 6
When the scientific uncertainty still surrounding the impacts of hundreds
of hazardous substances is coupled with the difficulty of measuring the effec-
tiveness of responses at hazardous waste sites, the reasonable conclusion is
that a significant percentage of those Superfund sites remediated will be re-
opened. In the same manner, as health-based performance standards7 are
relied upon to protect public health and the environment at CERCLA clean-
ups, and, as has historically been the case, those performance standards are
made more stringent and utilized more frequently, it will be difficult to per-
suade the EPA that ten and fifteen year old remedies still protect public
health and that further response action is not needed to prevent threats to
the environment. With the forward march of technology, remediation meth-
ods and detection capabilities will each improve, advancing to greater levels
of precision. As public awareness and understanding of the health effects of
hazardous substances grow, pressure will mount to achieve levels of
remediation consistent with criteria of then established parameters. In such
a setting, reopening Superfund settlements for further remediation becomes
more a likelihood than a possibility.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 19868 (SARA)
codified the authority of the EPA to enter into settlement agreements and
permitted it to release responsible parties from liability under CERCLA.
SARA incorporated many of the features contained in the EPA's interim
CERCLA settlement policy,9 and adopted the EPA's preference for issuing
TIONS, at 103 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 349, 1988); Gene A.
Lucero, Superfund Settlements: Negotiations, Settlement Process and Issues, in HAZARDOUS
WASTE LITIGATION 1988: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, at 249 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 349, 1988); Richard H. Mays, Settle-
ments with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Procedures under the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act, in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 1988: CURRENT
PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, at 229 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 326, 1988); Stephen D. Ramsey, How To Settle Superfund Cases, A.L.I.-
A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, Aug. 1988, at 117; Stephen D. Ramsey & Samuel I. Gutter, Settle-
ment in Superfund Cases, in 374 HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 1989: ADVANCED TACTICS
AND PRACTICE, at 259 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 374,
1989); Frank B. Cross, Settlement Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 66 OR. L. REV.
517 (1987); James M. Strock, Settlement Policy Under the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 599 (1988); William W. Balcke, Note,
Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123
(1988); Peter F. Sexton, Comment, Superfund Settlements: The EPA's Role, 20 CONN. L. REV.
923 (1988).
6. Generally, the EPA considers remedy failure to include any instance where the re-
sponse at a CERCLA site no longer adequately protects public health and the environment.
See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
7. In its Superfund Program, the EPA defines performance standards as "those cleanup
standards, standards of control, and other substantive requirements, criteria or limitations set
forth in the ROD [Record of Decision] of Section - of the SOW [Statement of Work]."
Notice: Model CERCLA RD/RA Consent Decree, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,996, 30,998 (1991) [here-
inafter Model Consent Decree].
8. Pub. L. No. 99-499; 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (amending CERCLA of 1980).
9. Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (1985) [hereinafter Policy].
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so-called releases in the form of covenants not to sue.' 0 In addition to estab-
lishing the EPA's authority to grant covenants, not to sue, section 122(0 of
SARA also establishes specific requirements and guidelines governing the
context in which the EPA may issue covenants."I SARA also empowers the
EPA to further restrict the scope and extent of the covenants. 12
This Article addresses the legal principles governing the interpretation
and application of those provisions of section 122 of CERCLA which con-
tain reopener provisions, the EPA Guidance,' 3 the EPA Model Consent De-
cree,"4 and the sparse related case law interpreting them. After analyzing
the EPA's use and interpretation of reopeners, the Article considers those
specific areas where the EPA Guidance or the Model Consent Decree have
established special policies involving reopeners, specifically: de minimis set-
tlements, natural resource damages, mixed funding settlements, and SARA's
five year review requirements. The Article concludes with an evaluation of
the effectiveness of the Superfund reopener provisions as settlement tools,
their extension of liability at Superfund sites, and their consequences for
business.
I. SUMMARY OF SECTION 122 OF SARA
Section 122(0(1) of SARA authorizes the EPA, at its discretion, to "pro-
vide any person with a covenant not to sue concerning any liability to the
United States under this chapter, including future liability, resulting from a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance addressed by a reme-
dial action, whether that action is onsite or offsite."' 5 The EPA, however,
may only provide a covenant if it is in the public interest, if it would expedite
responses consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), if the per-
son responding is in full compliance with a consent decree under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606 for response to the release or threatened release, and if the response
has been approved by the EPA. 16 Before entering into a covenant not to sue,
the EPA must assess, and, presumably, establish in the administrative rec-
ord, the appropriateness of a covenant by reviewing seven public interest
factors set forth in section 122(0(4).' 7 Section 122(0 requires the EPA to
10. Id. See Guidance, supra note 3. A release is defined as "the abandonment of a claim
to a party against whom it exists; it is a surrender of a cause of action and may be gratuitous or
for a consideration." Melo v. National Fuse & Powder Co., 267 F. Supp. 611, 612 (D. Colo.
1967). Conversely, the more narrow covenant not to sue is defined as "[a] covenant by one
who had a right of action at the time of making it against another person, by which he agrees
not to sue to enforce such right of action." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, 329 (5th ed. 1979).
The covenant "does not extinguish the cause of action and does not release other joint
tortfeasors even if it does not specifically reserve rights against them." Van Cleave v. Gamboni
Constr. Co., 665 P.2d 250, 252 (Nev. 1983).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0 (1988).
12. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(C).
13. Guidance, supra note 3.
14. Model Consent Decree, supra note 7.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0(1).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 9622(0(4). This section requires the EPA to consider the following public inter-
est factors in the decision whether to grant a covenant not to sue to a settling party:
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provide settlers at CERCLA sites with covenants not to sue for future liabil-
ity in two specific instances. These special covenants not to sue are found in
section 122(0(2). This section provides that if the four conditions of section
122(0(1) are met, the EPA "shall provide [settlers] with a covenant not to
sue with respect to future liability to the United States" if (1) the EPA re-
jects an onsite response which complies fully with the NCP and requires a
remedial action involving off site disposal of hazardous substances, or (2) the
selected response involves the treatment of hazardous substances so as to
destroy, eliminate, or permanently immobilize the hazardous constituents of
such substances.' 8 A section 122(0(2) covenant not to sue can apply to an
entire remedial action or to only that portion of the response which satisfies
the requirements of subsections (A) and (B). 19 Section 122(0(3) establishes
a covenant not to sue will take affect only after the EPA has certified that the
remedial action has been completed properly.20 Similarly, covenants not to
sue under section 122 are specifically tied to the satisfactory performance of
a settling party's obligation under any consent decree or administrative con-
sent order (ACO).2 1
Section 122(f)(6), titled Additional Condition for Future Liability, con-
tains the exceptions to covenants not to sue for future liability. Under sec-
tion 122(f)(6)(A) the EPA must except from any covenant not to sue for
future liability any liability related to a release or threatened release which is
the subject of the covenant where such liability arises from conditions un-
known at the time the remedial action is certified as complete. 22 This provi-
sion, known as a reopener for unknown conditions, does not automatically
apply to special covenants not to sue mandated under section 122(0(2) or for
de minimis settlements pursuant to section 122(g) of CERCLA. 23
Section 122(f)(6)(B) allows a waiver of the reopener for unknown condi-
tions under "extraordinary circumstances."' 24 To justify a waiver of the un-
(A) The effectiveness and reliability of the remedy, in light of the other alter-
native remedies considered for the facility concerned.
(B) The nature of the risks remaining at the facility.
(C) The extent to which performance standards are included in the order or
decree.
(D) The extent to which the response action provides a complete remedy for
the facility, including a reduction in the hazardous nature of the substances at
the facility.
(E) The extent to which the technology used in the response action is demon-
strated to be effective.
(F) Whether the fund or other sources of funding would be available for any
additional remedial actions that might eventually be necessary at the facility.
(G) Whether the remedial action will be carried out, in whole or in significant
part, by the responsible parties themselves.
18. Id. § 9622(f)(2)(A), (B).
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0(3).
21. Id. § 9622(0(5).
22. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(A).
23. Id. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1038 (D.C.
Mass 1989) (district court rejected a proposed consent decree on the grounds it failed to in-
clude the mandatory reopener).
24. 42 U.S.C § 9622(f)(6)(B).
1084 [Vol. 45
REOPENER LIABILITY
known conditions reopener for extraordinary circumstances the EPA must
demonstrate that its decision to waive the exception included consideration
of "relevant factors such as those referred to in paragraph [section 122(f)](4)
and volume, toxicity, mobility, strength of evidence, ability to pay, litigative
risks, public interest considerations, precedential value, and inequities and
aggravating factors. ' '25 Notwithstanding the possibility for a waiver for ex-
traordinary circumstances, the reopener for unknown conditions may not be
waived if the EPA, in its discretion, determines that without the reopener
the remaining terms of the consent decree or ACO fail "to assure protection
of public health, welfare, and the environment."
26
II. PRE-SARA EPA POLICY
Prior to the passage of SARA, the EPA's settlement philosophy could be
found in its interim CERCLA settlement policy (Policy). 27 Based on its
three years of experience 2 8 with negotiation in litigation of hazardous waste
cases, the EPA re-evaluated its settlement policy to encourage voluntary
cleanups.29 As one of its general principles, the EPA stated it recognized
"the value of some measure of finality in determinations of liability and in
settlements generally."' 30 The EPA acknowledged in the Policy that poten-
tially responsible parties (PRPs) "want some certainty in return for assum-
ing the costs of cleanup" 3' and conceded that certainty and finality were
incentives for encouraging private party lead cleanups.32 Its specific policy
for implementing these general principles, however, offered very little in the
way of certainty and even less in the way of finality.
The Policy, prepared jointly by the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the EPA, established several axioms which would later find their
way into section 122 of SARA. Underlying the framework for settlement of
CERCLA claims was the conclusion that the need for finality in settlements
must be balanced against the need to insure that PRPs remain responsible
for recurring endangerments and unknown conditions at a CERCLA site.
33
Through the Policy, the EPA informed PRPs that "releases from liability
will not automatically be granted merely because the Agency has approved
the remedy."'34 The Policy set forth the principle that the nature and scope
of a release of liability would be directly related to the confidence that the
EPA had that the selected remedy would ultimately prove effective and reli-
able. 35 The Policy included a number of provisions specifically addressing
the preservation of reopeners and the limited scope of any release or cove-
25. Id.
26. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(C).
27. Policy, supra note 9.




32. Policy, supra note 9, at 5035.





nant not to sue. 36 The Policy is also the source of eight other restrictions on
covenants not to sue which inevitably found their way into consent decrees
and ACOs.37 The Policy, published in response to complaints that resources
were being expended on litigation rather than cleanup because of the govern-
ment's inflexible attitude towards settlement, formalized the EPA's intrac-
tibility rather than comforting settling parties that they would receive some
real measure of finality and certainty in settlement. One other point about
the Policy must be noted: reopeners were limited to previously unknown
conditions or receipt of additional information which indicated an imminent
and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, and the environ-
ment.38 SARA eliminated this self-imposed restriction on the use of
reopeners. 39
III. PRESENT LIABILITY AND FUTURE LIABILITY
Section 122(0(1) empowers the EPA to "provide any person with a cove-
nant not to sue concerning any liability to the United States ... including
future liability." 4 The EPA, in the Guidance, 41 interprets the term "any
liability" to include a settling party's obligation to pay those response costs
incurred by the EPA prior to certification under section 122(0(3) and to
complete the remedial activities included in the Record of Decision (ROD)
for a given CERCLA site as contained in the operative consent decree or
36. Among other provisions, the Policy provides that "[r]eleases or covenants must also
include certain reopeners which preserve the right of the Government to seek additional
cleanup action and recover additional costs from responsible parties in a number of circum-
stances." Id. The Policy stated that, at a minimum, reopeners would be required for unknown
or undetected conditions arising or discovered after the time of settlement which present immi-
nent and substantial danger. Id. at 5040. It also provided for reopening the settlement when
the EPA receives additional information, unavailable at the time of settlement, indicating con-
ditions at the site may present an imminent or substantial danger to public health or the envi-
ronment. Id. The Policy also provided for waiver of the reopeners under extraordinary
circumstances. Id.
37. They include:
(a) Only the PRP providing consideration may receive a covenant not to sue;
(b) The covenant not to sue may cover only those claims involved in the case;
(c) Criminal matters may not be released;
(d) Releases for partial cleanups are limited to work actually completed;
(e) Release of natural resource damage claims require the approval of the Fed-
eral Trustees;
(f) Settling parties must release any related claims against the federal govern-
ment including the Hazardous Substances Response Fund;
(g) The covenant not to sue does not become effective until the response is
complete in a manner satisfactory to the EPA;
(h) Releases should be drafted as covenants not to sue in order to protect the
federal government.
Policy, supra note 9, at 5040.
38. Id.
39. SARA deletes the requirement of establishing that conditions at the site present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment in
order to reopen a settlement and replaces it with a provision which allows the reopener to be
triggered upon a release or threatened release. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0(1).
41. Guidance, supra note 3.
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ACO.42 The EPA further contended that "since there is no release of future
liability prior to certification, there is no need for reopeners" in the period of
time that a settling party might be exposed to so-called present liability. 43
Moreover, a settling party's failure to complete the required remedial activi-
ties or pay prior response costs are matters for which the settling parties are
directly responsible to the court under the EPA's Model Consent Decree."
Since the EPA's definition of a "reopener" states it "is a provision which
reserves EPA's right to require settling parties to take further response ac-
tion in addition to cleanup measures already provided for in a settlement
agreement notwithstanding the covenant not to sue" - it is obvious that a
reopener is not required for enforcement action involving a settling party's
precertification or present liability.45 Thus, it is appropriate that any failure
of response can be addressed through dispute resolution or by the court or
agency under the consent decree or ACO.
The EPA defines future liability as "a responsible party's obligation to
perform any additional response activities [beyond those in the consent de-
cree or ACO] at the site which are necessary to protect public health and the
environment." 46 Since section 122(o requires certification before a covenant
not to sue can be effective, reopeners or exceptions to covenants not to sue
become necessary or operative only after certification.47 Reopeners for future
liability fall within two broad areas. SARA expressly required a reopener
for unknown conditions. 48 SARA also authorized the EPA "to include any
other provisions" allowing future enforcement action in the discretion of the
EPA when such provisions are "necessary and appropriate to assure protec-
tion of public health, welfare and the environment. '49
Pursuant to the authority of section 122(f)(c), the EPA established a sec-
ond reopener which addresses situations where "additional information
reveals that the remedy is no longer protective of public health or the envi-
ronment." 50 The EPA, in justifying this second reopener, added "[i]t is not
in the public interest to release responsible parties for liability for additional
response actions made necessary by new information, given, as noted in the
Interim Settlement Policy, (Policy) 'the current state of scientific uncertainty
concerning the impact of hazardous substances, our ability to detect them,
and the effectiveness of remedies at hazardous waste sites.' t)s
Under these broadly worded provisions, the EPA is positioned not only to
reopen CERCLA settlements for conditions unknown and unreflected in the
42. Id. at 28,040.
43. Id. at 28,041.
44. Model Consent Decree, supra note 7, at 31,000, 31,005.
45. Guidance, supra note 3, at 28,038.
46. Id. at 28,040.
47. Id. at 28,041.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A).
49. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(C). In at least one case, United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F.
Supp. 666, 672 (D.N.J. 1989), the EPA utilized its section 122(f)(6)(C) authority to require a
reopener which would be triggered if the clean-up exceeded a total cost of $94 million.
50. Guidance, supra note 3, at 28,041.
51. Id. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 5039 (1985)).
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administrative record at the time of settlement (ie., undisclosed facts, un-
known site conditions), but also to reopen settlements based on the even
more vague standard of discovering after-acquired "additional information"
which reveals "that the remedy is no longer protective of public health or the
environment. '52
A. Unknown Conditions
SARA specifically provides for a reopener when liability at a CERCLA
site "arises out of conditions which are unknown at the time the President
certifies under paragraph (3) [of section 122(0(3)] that remedial action has
been completed at the facility concerned."' 53 Section 122(f)(6)(B) allows the
EPA to settle without an unknown conditions reopener under "extraordi-
nary circumstances" and departs from the EPA's interim policy in two sig-
nificant respects. Under the Policy the EPA could reopen a settlement
"[w]here previously unknown or undetected conditions ... arise or are dis-
covered" which "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
public health, welfare or the environment." 54 By eliminating the term "un-
detected" SARA limits the reopener to those instances where the EPA can
demonstrate it did not have knowledge of the newly discovered conditions at
the time of certification. By rejecting the EPA's requirement that unknown
conditions reveal an imminent and substantial endangerment to public
health welfare and the environment,5 5 and replacing it with language tying
the reopening for unknown conditions to a more general protection stan-
dard, SARA broadened the grounds for invocation of the reopener. 56 No
clear standard or criteria has been established for determining when condi-
tions unknown at the time of certification warrant reopening a settlement in
order to insure that no threat to public health and the environment exists.
At least one commentator has noted that the establishment of knowledge in
possession of the EPA at the time of certification is closely tied to active
participation in and contribution to, the administrative record and, to the
extent possible, the language in any ROD. 57
The EPA's Model Consent Decree attempts to extract an agreement from
PRPs that the EPA's precertification knowledge contains only that informa-
tion and those conditions set forth in the ROD and the administrative rec-
ord.58 The Model Consent Decree provides that with respect to Post-
Certification Reservations the EPA's knowledge is limited to that informa-
52. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(0(6)(A).
54. Policy, supra note 9, at 5040.
55. Id. at 5034.
56. See, Gene A. Lucero, Superfund Settlement: Negotiations, Settlement Process and Is-
sues, in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 1988: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL SO-
LUTIONS at 259 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 349, 1988).
57. Stephen D. Ramsey & Maureen M. Gough, The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 1988: CURRENT PROBLEMS
AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS at 448 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 349, 1988).
58. Model Consent Decree, supra note 7, at 31,009.
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tion and those conditions found in the ROD, the administrative record sup-
porting the ROD, and any information received pursuant to the consent
decree prior to certification. 59
Neither SARA nor the Model Consent Decree give guidance as to what
constitutes "unknown conditions." At a minimum, however, the term
should include any or all of the following: (1) information withheld from
EPA by PRPs which might have resulted in the entry of a Consent Decree
containing different substance, (2) then existing and present contaminants or
concentrations of contaminants unknown to EPA at the time of certification,
(3) new information concerning the fate, mobility or transport of contami-
nants at the site.
Other previously unknown conditions which could trigger the reopener
might include discovery of a more protective remedy, inadequacy of the
technology utilized, or changed conditions on the ground. By utilizing the
Model Consent Decree to narrow the universe of conditions "known" to the
EPA, the EPA broadens the universe of conditions it may later claim were
unknown. The EPA also seeks to foreclose challenge to the extent of its
prior knowledge by making all settling parties acknowledge these limitations
at the time the party executes the consent decree or ACO.60 Further, it is
noteworthy that the EPA elected to define the boundaries of its knowledge
rather than define or establish criteria for an "unknown condition." By so
doing, the EPA not only diminishes the value of any covenant not to sue but
also places the burden of proof on the settling party to demonstrate, presum-
ably after executing a Model Consent Decree, that conditions which might
reopen PRP liability were known to the EPA at the time of settlement.
Proving the EPA had knowledge of conditions beyond those reflected in the
administrative record or the ROD will undoubtedly be difficult.
B. Additional Information
Section 122(f)(6)(C) of SARA authorizes the EPA to include additional
provisions in its covenants not to sue which, in its discretion, "are necessary
and appropriate to assure protection of public health, welfare, and the envi-
ronment." 61 In its Guidance, the EPA explained the reasons for creating a
second reopener, known generally as the additional information reopener,
for future liability:
59. Id. The exact language of paragraph 82 of the Model Consent Decree reads as
follows:
For purposes of paragraph 80 [Pre-certification Reservations], the information
and the conditions known to EPA shall include only that information and those
conditions set forth in the Record of Decision for the Site and the administrative
record supporting the Record of Decision. For purposes of paragraph 81 [Post-
certification Reservations], the information and conditions known to EPA shall
include only that information and those conditions set forth in the Record of
Decision, the administrative record supporting the Record of Decision, and any
information received by EPA pursuant to the requirements of this Consent De-
cree prior to Certification of Completion of the Remedial Action.
60. Id. at 31,009-10.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(C).
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EPA believes that it is in the public interest and consistent with the
Congressional intent to require a second reopener covering situations
where additional information reveals that the remedy is no longer pro-
tective of public health or the environment. It is not in the public inter-
est to release responsible parties from liability for additional response
actions made necessary by new information .... 62
The EPA's Model Consent Decree implements this exception to its covenant
not to sue by reserving its rights to prosecute under the consent decree, or in
a new action, its claims for additional costs and further response from PRPs
based on "information previously unknown" to the EPA which "together
with any other relevant information indicates that the remedial action is not
protective of human health or the environment. '63 The breadth of the addi-
tional information reopener, when coupled with the unknown conditions re-
opener, leaves a settling PR.P with no more than a covenant not to sue for
the work performed at the site pursuant to standards applicable to
Superfund cleanups at the time of a response. In the Policy, the EPA de-
scribed additional information as "information, which was not available at
the time of the agreement, concerning the scientific determinations on which
the settlement was premised (for example, health effects associated with
levels of exposure, toxicity of hazardous substances, and the appropriateness
of the remedial technologies for conditions at the site)."' 64 The Policy's re-
quirement that additional information must indicate a present, imminent,
and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, or the environment
is not included in either the Model Consent Decree or the Guidance. The
EPA, through the language of the Guidance, has attempted to convert and
expand the additional information reopener to cover the failure of the rem-
edy at the site.65 Citing undefined "congressional concern," the EPA added
that remedy failure includes not only a failure of the reliability of the reme-
dial technology utilized to respond at the site, but also "any situation in the
future at the site which is judged to present a threat to public health and the
environment."' 66 As an example, the EPA explained that "should health ef-
fect studies reveal that health-based performance levels relied upon in the
ROD are not protective of public health or the environment, and that public
health or the environment will be threatened without further response ac-
tion," the EPA may reopen the settlement. 67 While the EPA cautioned
these provisions are not meant to require "changes purely based on advances
in technology,"' 68 it appears it intended to reopen settlements when addi-
tional information in the form of advances in technology reveals a prior rem-
62. Guidance, supra note 3, at 28,041.
63. Model Consent Decree, supra note 7, at 31,009.
64. Policy, supra note 9, at 5040 (request for public comment Feb. 5, 1985).
65. See Guidance, supra note 3, at 28,041 (request for public comment July 27, 1987).
66. Id. Referencing the mixed funding provision of SARA, the EPA concludes, "responsi-
ble parties who have settled retain liability for additional work necessary to address remedy
failure." Id. Congressional concern, however, did not result in an express remedy failure
reopener. Instead, the EPA has extrapolated it from its general grant of authority found in





edy at a CERCLA site would not eliminate the then current threat to public
health or the environment.
The universe of information which could result in reopening a settlement
under the additional information provision is incalculable. For example, as-
sume arguendo, one performance standard used to reflect successful
remediation at a CERCLA site is to reduce benzene levels in soil to four
parts per million. This presently defined safe action level may be superseded
by lower threshold limits for benzene in soil in years to come. Once the
action levels have been reduced, can a PRP successfully argue that the "ad-
ditional information" does not reveal a threat to public health or the envi-
ronment without further response? In essence, for purposes of the additional
information reopener, the EPA has defined "remedy failure" to be the dis-
covery of any future condition relating to the site which, it concludes, ren-
ders the site a current threat to public health and the environment. The
reopener is in no way tied to the adequacy of the prior clean-up or the effec-
tiveness of the remedy selected by the EPA and the PRPs. The EPA's ca-
pacity through rule making and agency edict to lower acceptable levels and
require use of advancing remedial technologies, in addition to the unsure
nature of responses at CERCLA sites in general, make the additional infor-
mation reopener an invitation to perpetual liability at Superfund sites.
IV. SPECIAL SITUATIONS
The impact of the EPA's reopener policies is not limited to its general
application to Superfund cleanups. Rather, grafted upon the general policy
are at least four specific permutations which require attention.
A. De Minimis Contributors
In section 122(g)(1)(A) of SARA, Congress recognized the concept of a de
minimis contributor at a Superfund site. 69 Broadly defined, a de minimis
contributor or party is a "potentially responsible party who satisfies the re-
quirements for liability under section 107(a) of CERCLA and who does not
have a valid section 107(b) defense, but who has made only a minimal con-
tribution (by amount and toxicity) in comparison to other hazardous sub-
stances at the site."' 70 Section 122(g) of SARA reflects; generally, the
agency's position with regard to settlements with de minimis parties which
was set forth in the Policy. Section 122(g)(1) allows the EPA, upon a deter-
mination that a settlement is "practicable and in the public interest,"
promptly to reach a final settlement with de minimis PRPs through a con-
sent decree or administrative order.71 Settlement is authorized if a de
minimis PRP's contribution "involves only a minor portion of the response
cost at the facility concerned."' 72 If the above criteria is met, and if the EPA
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A).
70. Superfund Program; De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333,
24,334 (1987) [hereinafter De Minimis Settlement Guidance].
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1), (4).
72. Id. § 9622(g)(1).
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determines "the amount of the hazardous substances contributed by that [de
minimis] party to the facility," and "the toxic or other hazardous effects of
the substances contributed by that party to the facility" are "minimal in
comparison to other hazardous substances at the facility," settlement is au-
thorized. 73 As part of a de minimis settlement, the EPA may provide the
settling party with a covenant not to sue provided such a covenant would
not be "inconsistent with the public interest as determined under Subsection
(f) [Section 122(0] of this Section." '74
De minimis settlements, although not mandatorily subject to the unknown
conditions reopener, may, nevertheless, include reopener provisions under
section 122(f)(6)(C). 75 The De Minimis Settlement Guidance76 sets forth
three elements which are to be considered in determining the scope of any
covenant not to sue in a de minimis settlement.77 The nature of the covenant
and the scope of any reopener vary depending upon the timing of the settle-
ment, the amount of information available to the EPA at the time of the
settlement, and the amount of any premium payment made by the de
minimis parties as a part of such settlement. 78 As to those settlements made
with de minimis parties early in the investigatory phase, the EPA will re-
serve its rights against settling de minimis parties should information con-
cerning the volume or toxicity change. 79 The EPA frequently requires
settling parties, whether de minimis or not, to certify that they have dis-
closed all information in their possession concerning waste contribution or
financial capability.80
For precertification de minimis settlements, the EPA may require two
other reopeners. These reopeners are designed to protect the EPA from the
risks attendant to early settlement. They involve protection of "the Agency
against (1) the risk of cost overruns during the completion of the remedial
action and (2) the risk that further response action will be necessary in addi-
tion to the work specified in the ROD."' Section 122(j)(2) of SARA pre-
vents natural resource damage claims from being released in a de minimis or
other settlement.8 2 The EPA's De Minimis Settlement Guidance recom-
73. Id. § 9622(g)(1)(A).
74. Id. § 9622(g)(2).
75. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(C). See also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A) ("[lt]he President is authorized
to include any provisions allowing future enforcement action under section 9606 or 9607 of
this title ... to assure protection of public health, welfare, and the environment").
76. De Minimis Settlement Guidance, supra note 70.
77. Id. at 24,337.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. De Minimis Settlement Guidance, supra note 70, at 24,337. See United States v.
Vertac Chem. Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1215 (E.D. Ark. 1991). In Vertac, the court required con-
tinuing financial certification by those parties claiming insufficient resources to participate ful-
Ily in remediation. Id. at 1219.
81. De Minimis Settlement Guidance, supra note 70, at 24,337. Ironically, the EPA refers
repeatedly in its guidance and policies on Superfund settlements to the protection required of
"the Agency". It is as though the Agency exists with transcendent goals beyond those of the
members of the public that CERCLA was passed to protect, and with whom the Agency is
settling.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(j)(2).
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mends express reservation of those claims unless a federal natural resource
trustee has released them.83
The De Minimis Settlement Guidance is not directed to finality or cer-
tainty. Rather, it recognizes:
The legal fees and other transactions costs of negotiating and litigat-
ing with the Government, compounded by the potential costs of assert-
ing and defending claims for contribution with other PRPs at the site,
often could exceed the amount such minimal contributors would be ex-
pected to pay, even under a settlement or a judgment unfavorable to
them. As a result, de minimis parties often seek a swift and efficient
means to pay a sum that is commensurate with their involvement at the
site and allows them to be dismissed from further negotiations and liti-
gation. The Agency also needs a method for achieving settlements with
minimal waste contributions in order to make negotiations in litigation
more manageable.84
In this respect, the EPA's De Minimis Settlement Guidance is directed more
towards easing the logistics of its negotiations and litigation with private
parties, rather than achieving final resolution of liability and responsibility
for de minimis parties. In fact, regardless of the premium payment which
may be made by settling de minimis parties, the De Minimis Settlement Gui-
dance is clear that even if a party is truly de minimis it will not be released
unless "cost overrun or future remediation risks" are covered by non
de minimis PRPs.8 5  Since pre-ROD and pre-Remedial Investiga-
tion/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) settlements will not normally provide suffi-
cient technical data to result in an expansive release, direct settlement by de
minimis parties with the EPA will result primarily in a reduction of adminis-
trative expenses in the form of reduced legal fees and other litigation and
investigatory costs, rather than in a reduction of exposure to a failed remedy
or unknown condition.86
B. Natural Resource Damages
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C), liability under CERCLA includes
"damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from such a release."87 Section 122(j)(2) authorizes a covenant not to sue in
CERCLA settlement agreements pertaining to natural resource damages. 88
Such a covenant, however, may only be made if the federal natural resource
trustee has agreed to it in writing.89 Moreover, the federal natural resource
trustee may agree to such a covenant only "if the potentially responsible
83. De Minimis Settlement Guidance, supra note 70, at 24,337.
84. Id. at 24,334, 24,335.
85. Id. at 24,337.
86. De minimis settlers will also receive the benefit of contribution protection, just as
major PRPs will receive a reduction in the potential liability by the amount of the de minimis
settlement. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5).
87. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).




party agrees to undertake appropriate actions necessary to protect and re-
store the natural resources damaged by such release or threatened release of
hazardous substances." 90 By establishing the criteria for the granting of a
covenant not to sue for natural resource damages, SARA sets forth a clear
standard on which private parties may depend. Unfortunately, a strict inter-
pretation of the statutory language reveals the covenant may be granted only
"if the potentially responsible party agrees to undertake appropriate actions
necessary to protect and restore the natural resources." 9' The phrase "po-
tentially responsible party" appears to apply to the settling party. In those
instances where natural resource damages can be precisely calculated and
quantified at the time of settlement natural resource damage reopeners
would, theoretically, not be needed. Since this is rarely the case, however, a
natural resource damage reopener will normally be a part of any CERCLA
settlement. 92 Since natural resources are broadly defined, and since such
damages can include the cost of restoring, replacing or acquiring the
equivalent of the damaged resources, the reopener provision will be expan-
sive indeed.93 To date, as one commentator has noted "the natural resource
damages doctrine ... has in practical application hardly been implemented
at all."' 94 The blanket natural resource damage reopener made a part of vir-
tually all Superfund settlements will undoubtedly give rise to greater private
party future liability exposure as the doctrine establishing recovery for natu-
ral resource damages develops.
C. Mixed Funding/Five- Year Review
Under section 122(b) of SARA, the EPA may enter into a settlement
agreement with potentially responsible parties whereby funding for imple-
90. Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(j)(2) (emphasis added).
92. The Model Consent Decree bears this thinking out at paragraph 83(3). It states that
"liability for damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources" is specifically
reserved from those covenants not to sue set forth at paragraph 80-82 of the Model Consent
Decree under EPA's General Reservations of Rights. Model Consent Decree, supra note 7, at
31,009-10.
93. Natural resources are defined as "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,
drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by,
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States ... any State or local govern-
ment, [or] any foreign governments." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988). Damages to natural re-
sources include the costs of restoring, replacing or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged
resources, the value of the lost use of that resource during the destruction and restoration, and
the reasonable costs of assessing the natural resource damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C),
(f)(1); see generally Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441-59 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)(CERCLA recovery should not be limited to the lesser of restoration or replacement
costs). Natural resource damages may even include damage to resources not directly owned
by the government if "[a] substantial degree of government regulation, management or other
form of control over privately owned property would make it a CERCLA natural resource."
Kevin M. Ward, Recovery of Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, 25 TORT. & INS. L.
J. 559, 572-73 (1990); see also Ohio, 880 F.2d at 432; Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F.Supp. 413
(M.D. Pa. 1989).
94. Barry Breen, Citizens Suits For Natural Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal
Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 851, 869 (1989)(advocates permitting citizen
suits for natural resource damages because such claims are a "relative rarity" under the cur-
rent government trustee system).
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mentation of a response at a site is mixed between private and public
funds.9" Pursuant to a mixed funding settlement agreement, the settling par-
ties will perform the response, but the EPA will finance it with fund mon-
eys. 96 The EPA is to make "all reasonable efforts to recover the amount of
such reimbursement under Section 9607."97 The EPA's decision regarding
availability and use of the fund for financing the response action is not sub-
ject to judicial review.98 In instances where mixed funding is selected, the
EPA and the Superfund shall be subject "to an obligation for subsequent
remedial actions at the same facility but- only to the extent that such subse-
quent actions are necessary by reason of the failure of the original remedial
action."99 The future obligation on the fund "shall be in a proportion equal
to, but not exceeding, the proportion contributed by the Fund for the origi-
nal remedial action."' 1 The fund's future remedial action obligation may
be met either through fund expenditures or through moneys recovered
through settlement or enforcement actions against those parties that did not
settle under the original agreement.' 0 '
Since the EPA's current policies favor private party funding of response
actions, the mixed funding provision of section 122 of SARA has not been
utilized frequently. From the standpoint of PRPs, utilization of the mixed
funding provision would result in greater certainty, less money committed to
the original response, and less exposure for future response. While reopeners
for unknown conditions and additional information would undoubtedly be
included, exposure under them could be limited to that percentage of the
original remedy funded by the private party.' 0 2 As a part of the Model Con-
sent Decree, settling defendants covenant not to make any claim for reim-
bursement from the fund.' 0 3 Because of the limitations of liability associated
with proportionate mixed fund cleanups, and the inherently greater direct
costs to the EPA associated with such a cleanup, widespread use of the
mixed funding provision, absent special circumstances, is unlikely.'°4
D. Five- Year Review
Congress passed section 121(c) of SARA to formalize its preference for
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 9622(b)(2).
99. Id. § 9622(b)(4).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(4).
101. Id.
102. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(4) (future obligation of the Fund "shall be in a
proportion equal to, but not exceeding, the proportion contributed by the Fund for the original
remedial action.").
103. Model Consent Decree, supra note 7, at 31,010 (1991). Under EPA's internal gui-
dance for implementation of mixed funding settlements dated October 20, 1987, a number of
scenarios are considered including shared work arrangements between EPA and the private
parties, partial private fundings with shared work arrangements, and Fund lead state and pri-
vate party sharing responses. Absent site specific litigation risks or other special circumstances
EPA has little incentive to participate in mixed funding when private party cleanups can be
imposed.
104. See 52 Fed. Reg. 31,010 (1987).
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permanent remedies. 10 5 Section 12 1(c) provides that when the EPA selects a
remedial action that permits any hazardous substances, pollutants, or con-
taminants to remain at the site, "the President shall review such remedial
action no less often than each five years after the initiation of such remedial
action to assure that human health and the environment are being protected
by the remedial action being implemented." 10 6 Beginning with the time re-
medial action is initiated, every five years, and, possibly, prior to certifica-
tion, the EPA must consider the factors which give rise to reopening any
settlement agreement made with private PRPs. 0 7 Under this "statutory"
reopener, if, in the EPA's judgment, "action is appropriate at such site in
accordance with Section 9604 or 9606" the EPA shall take or require further
response. 108 Such a review could result in a reopening of a settlement prior
to completion of the remedy. The provision assures that the EPA will re-
view those factors that may justify reopening the settlement each five years
after work at the site commences.l °9 There is no time limit under CERCLA
for ending the site review process.
V. CONCLUSION
Reopener liability under section 122 of CERCLA has no end. The cove-
nant not to sue with its reopeners and reservations of rights provided under
the Model Consent Decree offer little more than an agreement not to prose-
cute at the time of settlement for the work performed at the site, provided
such work is performed properly. The five-year review provision, however,
threatens the concept of a release for the work performed as of the settle-
ment date. In addition, reopeners could be triggered prior to completion of
a site's cleanup.
Arguably, the benefits of settlement with the EPA, such as contribution
protection and the very limited covenant not to sue, are offset by the "cer-
tainty" that a settling party is jointly and severally liable at the site not only
for the remedy being performed, but for myriad other costs and damages
which may arise in the future. Further, by entering into a consent decree or
ACO with the EPA, settling parties find themselves obliged to abide not only
by CERCLA's strict provisions, but also by the broader, discretionary re-
openers found in the EPA's guidance and policies. While the EPA contends
that the scope of any release is commensurate with the effectiveness and per-
manency of the remedy selected at PRP lead cleanups, this is not the case.
Rather, the effectiveness and permanency of the remedy may, in some in-
105. Section 121(b) establishes a preference for "treatment which permanently and signifi-
cantly reduces the volume toxicity or mobility of the hazardous substances, pollutants, and
contaminants" at remedial sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1).
106. Id. § 9621(c).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. In many instances backfilled soil or treated groundwater will contain residual ele-
ments of "hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants" at the site under the work plan
implemented through a consent decree. Id. § 9621(b)(1). A broad reading of Section 121(c)




stances, provide greater assurance that the unchanging reopener provisions
contained in the EPA's consent decrees will not be triggered, or will not be
triggered as soon. The effectiveness or perceived permanency of the remedy
at the time of settlement does nothing, however, to change the language or
scope of the reopeners in CERCLA settlement documents.
By utilizing the unknown conditions, additional information, and natural
resource damage reopeners in conjunction with SARA's mandatory five-year
review, the EPA has broad, almost unlimited, discretion to reopen sites, im-
pose stricter cleanup standards, and require PRPs to spend greater amounts
of money to achieve, in some cases, only marginal increases in protection of
the public and the environment. Private PRPs that have resolved their lia-
bility with the EPA in the mistaken belief that they have finally settled their
liability at a CERCLA site will find they have purchased a very expensive
policy of environmental term insurance which covers only the work previ-
ously performed and few, if any, future claims. Under such a system a pri-
vate PRP is arguably benefitted by rejecting an invitation to join the PRP
group, await contribution litigation, and contend its liability is several. By
avoiding settlement and execution of the EPA's Model Consent Decree a
private party may, in fact, be in a more advantageous position than if it had
settled with the EPA. With final settlement of CERCLA actions illusory
rather than real, reopener liability under CERCLA is not limited and, under
the current statutory and regulatory system, extends from here to eternity.
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